Here is a video overview:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-fow6GJepQ

Here is an image of the poster:
https://i.imgur.com/Ti9btj9.png

Grosse et al. use statistical tests to detect adversarial examples; additionally, machine learning algorithms are adapted to detect adversarial examples on-the-fly of performing classification. The idea of using statistics tests to detect adversarial examples is simple: assuming that there is a true data distribution, a machine learning algorithm can only approximate this distribution – i.e. each algorithm “learns” an approximate distribution. The ideal adversary uses this discrepancy to draw a sample from the data distribution where data distribution and learned distribution differ – resulting in mis-classification. In practice, they show that kernel-based two-sample statistics hypothesis testing can be used to identify a set of adversarial examples (but not individual one). In order to also detect individual ones, each classifier is augmented to also detect whether the input is an adversarial example. This approach is similar to adversarial training, where adversarial examples are included in the training set with the correct label. However, I believe that it is possible to again craft new examples to the augmented classifier – as is also possible with adversarial training.

Xu et al. propose feature squeezing for detecting and defending against adversarial examples. In particular, they consider “squeezing” the bit depth of the input images as well as local and non-local smoothing (Gaussian, median filtering etc.). In experiments they show that feature squeezing preserves accuracy while defending against adversarial examples. Figure 1 additionally shows an illustration of how feature squeezing can be used to detect adversarial examples.

https://i.imgur.com/Ixv522J.png
Figure 1: Illustration of using squeezing for adversarial example detection.

Also find this summary on [davidstutz.de](https://davidstutz.de/category/reading/).

Brendel et al. propose a decision-based black-box attacks against (deep convolutional) neural networks. Specifically, the so-called Boundary Attack starts with a random adversarial example (i.e. random noise that is not classified as the image to be attacked) and randomly perturbs this initialization to move closer to the target image while remaining misclassified. In pseudo code, the algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. Key component is the proposal distribution $P$ used to guide the adversarial perturbation in each step. In practice, they use a maximum-entropy distribution (e.g. uniform) with a couple of constraints: the perturbed sample is a valid image; the perturbation has a specified relative size, i.e. $\|\eta^k\|_2 = \delta d(o, \tilde{o}^{k-1})$; and the perturbation reduces the distance to the target image $o$: $d(o, \tilde{o}^{k-1}) – d(o,\tilde{o}^{k-1} + \eta^k)=\epsilon d(o, \tilde{o}^{k-1})$. This is approximated by sampling from a standard Gaussian, clipping and rescaling and projecting the perturbation onto the $\epsilon$-sphere around the image. In experiments, they show that this attack is competitive to white-box attacks and can attack real-world systems.

https://i.imgur.com/BmzhiFP.png
Algorithm 1: Minimal pseudo code version of the boundary attack.

Also find this summary at [davidstutz.de](https://davidstutz.de/category/reading/).

_Objective:_ Design Feed-Forward Neural Network (fully connected) that can be trained even with very deep architectures.

*   _Dataset:_ [MNIST](yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/), [CIFAR10](https://www.cs.toronto.edu/%7Ekriz/cifar.html), [Tox21](https://tripod.nih.gov/tox21/challenge/) and [UCI tasks](https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/optical+recognition+of+handwritten+digits).
*   _Code:_ [here](https://github.com/bioinf-jku/SNNs)

## Inner-workings:

They introduce a new activation functio the Scaled Exponential Linear Unit (SELU) which has the nice property of making neuron activations converge to a fixed point with zero-mean and unit-variance.  
They also demonstrate that upper and lower bounds and the variance and mean for very mild conditions which basically means that there will be no exploding or vanishing gradients.

The activation function is:  
[![screen shot 2017-06-14 at 11 38 27 am](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/17261080/27125901-1a4f7276-50f6-11e7-857d-ebad1ac94789.png)](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/17261080/27125901-1a4f7276-50f6-11e7-857d-ebad1ac94789.png)  
With specific parameters for alpha and lambda to ensure the previous properties. The tensorflow impementation is:

    def selu(x):
        alpha = 1.6732632423543772848170429916717
        scale = 1.0507009873554804934193349852946
        return scale*np.where(x>=0.0, x, alpha*np.exp(x)-alpha)
    

They also introduce a new dropout (alpha-dropout) to compensate for the fact that [![screen shot 2017-06-14 at 11 44 42 am](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/17261080/27126174-e67d212c-50f6-11e7-8952-acad98b850be.png)](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/17261080/27126174-e67d212c-50f6-11e7-8952-acad98b850be.png)

## Results:

Batch norm becomes obsolete and they are also able to train deeper architectures. This becomes a good choice to replace shallow architectures where random forest or SVM used to be the best results. They outperform most other techniques on small datasets.  
[![screen shot 2017-06-14 at 11 36 30 am](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/17261080/27125798-bd04c256-50f5-11e7-8a74-b3b6a3fe82ee.png)](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/17261080/27125798-bd04c256-50f5-11e7-8a74-b3b6a3fe82ee.png)

Might become a new standard for fully-connected activations in the future.