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A finding first publicized by Geoff Hinton is the fact that, when you train a simple, lower capacity module on the probability outputs of another model, you can often get a model that has comparable performance, despite that lowered capacity. Another, even more interesting finding is that, if you take a trained model, and train a model with identical structure on its probability outputs, you can often get a model with better performance than the original teacher, with quicker convergence. This paper addresses, and tries to specifically test, a few theories about why this effect might be observed. One idea is that the "student" model can learn more quickly because getting to see the full probability distribution over a well-trained models outputs gives it a more valuable signal, specifically because the trained model is able to better rank the classes that aren't the true class. For example, if you're training on Imagenet, on an image of a huskies, you're only told "this is a husky (1), and not one of 100 other classes, which are all 0". Whereas a trained model might say "'this is most likely a husky, but the probability of wolf is way higher than that of teapot". This inherently gives you more useful signal to train on, because you’re given a full distribution of classes that an image is most like. This theory goes by the name of the “Dark Knowledge” theory (a truly delightful name), because it pulls all of this knowledge that is hidden in a 0/1 label into the light. An alternative explanation for the strong performance of distillation techniques is that the student model is just benefitting from the implicit importance weighting of having a stronger gradient on examples where the teacher model is more confident. You could think of this as leading the student towards examples that are the most clear or unambiguous examples of a class, rather than more fuzzy and uncertain ones. Along with a few other tests (which I won’t address here, for sake of time and focus), the authors design a few experiments to test these possible mechanisms of action. The first test involved doing an explicit importance weighting of examples according to how confident the teacher model is, but including no information about the incorrect classes. The second was similar, but instead involved perturbing the probabilities of the classes that weren’t the max probability. In this situation, the student model gets some information in terms of the overall magnitudes of the not-max class, but can’t leverage it as usefully because it’s been randomized. In both situations, they found that there still was some value - in other words, that the student outperformed the teacher - but it outperformed by less than the case where the teacher could see the full probability distribution. This supports the case that both the inclusion of probabilities for the less probable classes, as well as the “confidence weighting” effect of weighting the student to learn more from examples on which the “teacher” model was more confident.
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